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Abstract: The recent publishing of the Criminal Code Reform, known as the Corporate Governance
Code and by which companies are prosecuted for the crimes they have committed, is contributing
towards improving the management of companies involved in using natural resources. This study
explores the disposition of environmental companies towards respect for nature in the context
of the new Spanish Criminal Code 1/2015. Over 916 companies, including 104 environmental
companies, have been asked about their knowledge of the code and the consequences it has for them
through a survey. The paper explores the influence of regulatory compliance, coercive enforcement
and cooperative actions on environmental companies to develop better attitudes towards nature.
Partial Least Squares (PLS) Path Modelling was used to build an interaction model among variables.
The results of the research reveal how environmental companies are more inclined to developing
organizational standards (Cooperative Environmental Protocols) and to improving compliance with
environmental law (coercive regulation). The model has a moderate predictive effect, explaining
54.1% of environmental companies’ Better Attitude towards Nature. The findings may have important
implications for environmental authorities when deterring environmental crimes.
Keywords: environmental companies; nature; coercive regulation; corporate compliance;
organizational standards; surveillance; cooperative regulation; environmental crime;
Spanish Criminal Code; PLS-SEM
1. Introduction
Environmental crimes have gradually increased despite the robust environmental policies
implemented in the past two decades [1,2]. Administrative sanctions handed down by environmental
agencies have lost their effectiveness [3]. The reasons behind this could be twofold. On the one hand,
policies are rapidly updated to include many new items, making it difficult for companies to follow [4],
and on the other, organizations and individuals have been driven to avoid complying with these
regulations due to the lack of clarity in the environmental regulations, low economic sanctions and
an absence of regular inspections and a sound legal policy to revert to in case of recidivism, etc. [5–7].
Since the industrial degradation, environmental entrepreneurs emerged quite rapidly as new
companies in the environmental sector [8]. The sustainable research in the field of entrepreneurship
has become crucial to deter threats to nature [9].
In this context, entrepreneurs have gradually sought to minimize the impact on the environment
by seeking solutions to bring the economy closer to ecology [10]. This approach is based on developing
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processes, activities, actions and attitudes linked to the emerging green opportunities through
organizational discoveries [11].
Likewise, extensive regulation has gradually increased to protect nature. The intention has
been not only to make the environment a habitable place but also to increase the green awareness of
sustainability within the company [12].
Regulatory compliance in environmental companies has been widely studied in the last
decades [13–19]. Companies not only comply with the law for instrumental reasons (to avoid
legal penalties) [20] but compliance has also guided companies’ moral and civic duties [21].
Environmental corporate compliance has traditionally based itself on rules and the awareness of
these rules to foster compliance with regulations. In other words, corporate regulations have focused
on formal coercive structures to comply with the law and have had mixed results. Whereas the
formal structure of corporate legal liability gives companies an incentive to reduce organizational
misconduct [22], rules and regulations based on formal structures barely commit them to a type or
degree of compliance [23]. Then, the only legal attempts to protect nature have not been consistent
enough to address the environmental threat adequately [24].
More recently, Cooperative Environmental Protocols have played a relevant role in fostering
environmental attitudes, and have revealed how rules influence employees’ attitudes and ethical
behavior [25].
In Spain, a new perspective from which to deter the environmental damages has emerged since
regulatory compliance came about in 2015. The Criminal Code, which is based on judging criminal
offences, was first introduced in Europe and years later in Spain with the aim of confronting organizations
that fail to comply with environmental policies. For the first time in history, the Corporate Governance
Code 1/2015 of 31 March 2015 [26], amending the previous Organic Law No. 10/1995 of November 23 [27],
began prosecuting companies as opposed to individuals. The law provides for crimes committed by
companies related to the planning of the territory and natural resources. In other words, this law comes
into action when a company causes substantial damage to the quality of the air, soil or water, or to animals
or plants.
In fact, several environmental companies have been sentenced since 2015. Recent court
judgements passed by the Spanish Supreme Court Judgement [28,29]. Ever since the “Corporate
Compliance” process was introduced, the outcome of these judgements has primarily been: economic
penalties, claims for damages, loss of reputation and loss of competitiveness [30,31].
The aim of the Corporate Governance Code was not only to raise the legal pressure on illegal
environmental companies but to encourage them to implement special surveillance measures to
address the environmental crimes committed by companies properly. In other words, environmental
companies must implement effective organizational surveillance and monitoring systems to avoid
criminal sanctions being imposed and to better protect nature [32].
The lack of empirical studies in environmental companies after the recent approval of the Spanish
Criminal Code has driven us to explore their influence on improving the attitudes towards nature.
The environmental orientation of Spanish companies’ and their willingness to develop stewardship
strategies in companies through the cooperative business model was tested. This paper examines
how environmental companies develop Better Attitudes towards Nature (BAN) either by following
coercive procedures (Coercive Environmental Enforcement (COER)) or collaborative procedures
(Cooperative Environmental Enforcement (COOP)). The aim is to guarantee the correct uses of
natural resources by responding adequately to the environmental norms or developing organizational
mechanisms in the context of the recent Spanish Corporate Governance Code [33].
To our knowledge, the relationship between how to develop BAN and the recent pressure
exerted by the Spanish Corporate Governance Code (Corporate Compliance in Environmental matters
(CCE)) has not been considered. In the circumstances, the contribution of the paper is twofold.
First, to explore the willingness of environmental companies to develop organizational standards
(cooperative environmental measures) and be more environmentally aware. Second, to ascertain
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the relevance of coercive regulations when it comes to developing environmental companies’ better
attitudes towards nature from the standpoint of the new Corporate Governance Code.
Four hundred and four environmental companies have already adhered to and fulfilled the
requirements of the Spanish Criminal Code 1/2015. A statistical study was made using SmartPLS on
the data collected [34]. The findings may have significant implications for environmental authorities
when deterring environmental crimes. This research also adds to the current literature by providing
new findings on how to incorporate the recent Corporate Governance Code into environmental
decisions to enhance compliance with environmental law.
The paper is structured as follows. The first section analyses current corporate compliance in
environmental companies. The second part links coercive and cooperative compliance with the law to
the attitudes based on respect towards nature. The third section describes how SmartPLS has been
used to study the variables and constructs from the data collected in 2017. The last part of the paper
includes the results and conclusions of the research and the implications our findings may have for
further research.
2. Literature Review
2.1. Corporate Compliance in Environmental Issues
The recent Spanish Criminal Code has expanded the provisions of Section 45 of the Spanish
Constitution (1978) on the protection of the environment [35]. Section 347 bis of the first Criminal Code,
approved in 1983 [36], clarified that he who violates the environmental provisions of the law mentioned
above will be considered to have committed a crime and will, therefore, be subject to the appropriate
administrative sanctions, as well as have an obligation to repair the damage caused. However, both the
Criminal Codes of 1983 [36] and 1995 [27] still addressed crimes by accusing individuals instead
of companies. It was not until 2010 when the code recognized the criminal responsibility of companies
for the first time. Sections 31 and 33(7) of the Spanish Criminal Code 5/2010, of 22 June 2010 [36],
explained the procedure to be followed to punish companies and the range of sanctions to be applied.
The 2015 version amended all earlier versions. The current wording of Section 173(1) explained
in further detail what was to be understood by environmental crime and updated the applicable
sanctions [26]. It stresses that, “Companies will be punished with imprisonment from six months
to two years, a fine of ten to fourteen months and special disqualification for profession or trade for
a period of one to two years which, in contravention of the laws or other provisions of general nature
protective of the environment, directly or indirectly cause emissions, discharges, radiation, extractions
or excavations, earthworks, noise, vibration, injections or deposits, in the atmosphere, soil, subsoil or
terrestrial, underground or marine waters”.
Even though individuals bear the end responsibility, liability is passed on to the company
(vicarious liability). Therefore, the company’s criminal liability is not direct, an individual must
have committed a crime on its behalf [37]. This individual must have powers of representation,
and de facto or de jure exercise the management, representation or government of the legal entity.
Apart from companies’ legal representatives, crimes can also be committed by employees in the
exercise of corporate activities and for the account and benefit of legal entities. The legal entity can,
therefore, not be attributed direct authorship of a crime, but at most, a form of participation in the
crime committed by the individual [38].
The paper is focused on five hypotheses to measure the influence of the recent reformed Spanish
Criminal Code on enhancing better attitudes towards nature. The hypotheses proposed for this study
were:
1. H1—Corporate Compliance in Environmental matters (CCE) positively influences Better Attitude
towards Nature (BAN).
2. H2—Corporate Compliance in Environmental matters (CCE) positively influences Coercive
Environmental Enforcement (COER).
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3. H3—Coercive Environmental Enforcement (COER) positively influences Better Attitude towards
Nature (BAN).
4. H4—Corporate Compliance in Environmental matters (CCE) positively influences Cooperative
Environmental Protocols (COOP).
5. H5—Cooperative Environmental Protocols (COOP) positively influences Better Attitude towards
Nature (BAN).
Environmental regulations have gradually increased over the past decades to protect nature
globally [39]. Despite the increased pressure of these regulations on companies, further improvement
is still required to address environmental threats to nature adequately. Unfortunately, to date, these
regulations have not been strong enough to reduce environmental crimes [40,41].
In the context of the reformed Criminal Code, this study addresses how this law affects Spanish
environmental companies. To be more specific, H1 intends to gain further insight into how the new
the regulatory compliance influences the two critical aspects of environmental companies to improve
their attitudes towards nature. These aspects are: (1) the balance between economy and ecology in
environmental companies and (2) the awareness of the potential damages towards nature.
These key attributes also reflect the right stewardship perspective to deal with natural resources,
which also raises the current debate between anthropocentrism and stewardship, i.e., the dialectics
between those who emphasize the role of nature created explicitly for man’s benefit, which has
deteriorated the environment, and those who enhance the role of stewardship. Some questions arise
in this respect: Is the new regulatory compliance oriented to the environment? Are the new legal
systems that allow judges to prosecute companies—not only individuals—an effective weapon to
better protect nature?
Hypotheses 1 (H1). Corporate Compliance in Environmental matters positively influence Better Attitude
towards Nature.
2.2. Coercive Regulation in the Regulatory Compliance
In the last decades, a far-reaching literature review has debated how environmental laws influence
and are influenced by organizations [42]. The enforcement policies aimed at environmental companies
have not only come from internal standards but also external governmental rules, including non-legal
actions based on environmental activism [43] or competitive market dynamics [44]. These enforcement
policies end up in measures of control imposed on environmental companies to respond to the external
environmental demand.
The Corporate Compliance Regulation has channeled these external measures by pushing
companies to comply with the environmental law. How the regulatory compliance influences the
coercive norms within the environmental companies is a crucial factor. Willingness to observe the
law is not relevant since regulatees do not develop the ability to comply with the law [45]. In other
words, understanding how regulatees comply with the law is a prior condition to designing coercive
environmental enforcement measures in companies.
Companies have proven to have two strong motivations when attempting to comply with the
environmental law. First, the fear of violating the environmental law, and second, the sanctions
imposed by public authorities if they do so.
For decades, the traditional regulatory enforcement has been built over the assumed proposal
of the positive connection between the number of environmental norms and level of compliance.
The increase of environmental rules has always been considered enough to raise environmental
awareness and foster outcomes. Thus, in H2 the focus was not on the number of external rules that the
company must adhere to, but on the real environmental control established over the employees and
how this control is updated to respect nature more efficiently. Unfortunately, how those environmental
rules are designed, updated and obeyed has typically played a secondary role.
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To bridge the gap, experts on regulations proposed six essential elements to motivate regulatees to
comply with the environmental law [46,47]. First, the degree of motivation to comply with regulation
and rules. The benefits of compliance should be higher than the risk of damage to the corporate
reputation, the cost to put these rules into effect and the sanctions imposed otherwise. Second, the civic
values contained in every regulation express a form of civic commitment [48]. Third, acceptance of
the norms also depends on the reasonableness of the regulatory system [49] and the legitimacy of the
authorities who enforce those rules [50]. Fourth, the social motivation to build their own reputation [51].
The willingness to comply with the law has a socializing effect on regulated environmental companies
as they strive to earn social approval within the market. Social interaction has recently evolved
due to technology, one of the key factors to link corporate compliance with coercive environmental
enforcement. Fifth, the indispensable requisite of knowing the rules, namely of what a given regulation
obliges one to do. Regulatees need to comprehend the regulations, which can be done by avoiding
legal complexity and vagueness. Sixth, the capacity to comply with the law is also an essential factor.
This capacity lays on several practical considerations, such as the cost of compliance, the financial
capacity required from companies and the social pressure exerted.
The Criminal Code Reform has gone through all those considerations and yielded mixed results.
First, the degree of motivation to comply with the law is addressed in the reform since the effect of
the corporate law on companies provides companies two benefits: (1) control over corruption and its
cost for the companies [52,53] and (2) reputational improvement by developing surveillance norms.
Second, the civic values that regulate the companies’ proper behavior are contained in the Introduction
to the Spanish Corporate Code [26]. Third, the legitimacy to enforce legal compliance falls on the
judiciary system, which is the most prestigious legal body in Spain. Fourth, the approach to social
motivation in the current regulatory compliance system is crucial since reputational corporate actions
are built around the level of legal compliance. Fifth, the current reformed law has failed to communicate
its aims to the Spanish environmental companies since only 35% of Spanish environmental companies
are aware of the legal obligations of the Spanish Corporate Criminal Code. Only 20% have incorporated
the figure of a compliance officer, and 11% have successfully developed and applied surveillance norms
in the company. Sixth, compliance with the corporate law does not imply a high cost or complicated
procedures. Judges do not impose rigid procedures to be implemented by environmental companies.
Therefore, every company can use these indicators to suit their own procedures.
Coercive environmental norms are studied in the framework of a set of improved attitudes
towards nature. First, it is fair to say that external environmental norms, such as governmental and
legal, have provided a noticeable improvement in human-living conditions and nature [54]. From this
perspective, coercive environmental enforcement has tried to achieve better compliance with the
environmental law. This is one of the reasons behind the increase in environmental regulations and
the expansion of the punishment systems almost at the same speed.
Environmental outcomes are critical in reaching a high standard of environmental compliance.
However, it is common for companies to meet the minimal standards prescribed by the regulations.
This means that the outcomes have not been as effective as expected [55,56]. As a result,
environmental companies have not been able to build credibility appropriately in the eyes of
stakeholders [57]. This lack of trustworthiness has led to the search for independent evaluations
of these environmental reports.
As political and economic deterrence, new rules have been enforced to protect nature based on
intimidation, threats, prosecution, apprehension, etc. These institutional pressures have been broadly
studied recently [42,58]. However, the organizational system to prevent environmental crimes and
achieve better attitudes towards nature goes beyond environmental regulations [59] and coercive
measures [60].
Despite the adverse effects of the deterrence policy, the Spanish Criminal Code promotes coercive
measures by prosecuting unlawful environmental companies, but it also allows companies to mitigate
corporate sanctions, which exceed the regulatory perspective [61].
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In this context, H3 analyses how the new legal deterrence programme introduced by the recent
Criminal Code contributes towards improving companies’ attitude towards nature.
Then, to be respectful to the environment, companies need to adapt their organizational
management through the decision-making process. This was expressly highlighted in the reformed
Spanish Code as the pivotal issue from which respectful decisions towards nature stem [62],
represented by the voluntary disclosure of environmental standards to protect nature [63].
Hypotheses 2 (H2). Corporate Compliance in Environmental matters positively influences Coercive
Environmental Enforcement.
Hypotheses 3 (H3). Coercive Environmental Enforcement positively influences Better Attitude
towards Nature.
2.3. Cooperative Environmental Measures
Developing organizational standards aims to protect nature, as explained in the above hypotheses.
However, a second objective should also be noted. The Criminal Code offers the option to mitigate or
avoid sanctions by developing surveillance measures to control the activities that might imply criminal
behavior by companies.
From this legal scenario, such surveillance measures are not expressly required by law. In other
words, these measures are not imposed coercively but collaboratively to avoid criminal sanctions
on companies.
Impartial judges assess the organizational mechanisms developed by companies to respect nature
based on the Spanish Corporate Governance Code in an attempt to guarantee the correct uses of
natural resources. The recent Corporate Compliance programme has set out several managerial
aspects, namely organizational standards, as part of this new culture [64]. By meeting this integral
perspective, managers and employers are less likely to be prosecuted criminally.
Compliance officers (ECOs) design such organizational standards in their capacity as company
management [65]. H4 reflects the efforts of compliance officers to design indicators and integrate
respectful behavior towards the laws, organization regulations and rules through an appropriate
decision-making model [66].
Officers can be established as an internal body or outsourced. There seems to be a consensus that
compliance officers should be legal representatives or persons specifically appointed by the company
and have knowledge on a wide array of subjects (criminal law, regulations and ethics). Their legitimacy
is conferred by the organization to encourage employees to apply behavioral and ethical standards [67].
Corporate Compliance, therefore, guarantees the credibility of the standards by creating an ethical
and organizational environment in companies [68,69]. By developing training programs and reporting
performance management outcomes, officers enhance the employees’ environmental commitment
towards protecting nature [57], inspiring employees to support an ethical climate within the
organizational procedures [70].
This new culture established by law not only prevents them from committing environmental
crimes [71] but also from carrying out wrongful or uncertain environmental procedures [72].
For these procedure standards to be established [73], compliance officers must oversee their
reliability [74] and ensure that the employees are made aware of them by inviting them to engage in
training programs or spreading publications to explain them empirically, for instance.
Companies must also reassert the compliance procedure in place to detect possible environmental
criminal conduct through auditing systems, and the appropriate disciplinary procedures must be
attached, for use if not fulfilled.
The Explanatory Memorandum of the Spanish Corporate Governance Code 1/2015,
of 31 March 2015 [26], underlines that companies should incorporate all possible mechanisms to
prevent environmental crimes (Section 31 bis, Spanish Corporate Governance Code).
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These mechanisms provide a model of organization based on several items (see Figure 1):
(1) Establishment of a management model that includes the appropriate surveillance and control
measures to prevent crimes [75]. (2) Creation of a department to supervise the compliance when
implementing the prevention model [76]. (3) Due diligence towards activities in which crimes are
committed [77–79]. (4) To undertake training protocols or procedures to apply surveillance rules to
either employers and employees [80–82]. (5) Allocation of financial resources to run the corporate
preventive model [83,84]. (6) Report possible risks and non-compliances through whistleblowing
channels [85]. (7) Establishment of a disciplinary system to prevent non-compliance through
sanctions [86]. (8) Periodic verification of the preventive model and its timely update when relevant
infractions are committed, and when organizational changes make them necessary [87,88].
Figure 1. Organizational system to prevent environmental crime (Article 31 bis, Corporate Governance
Code) [26].
The above hypotheses analyses the ability to comply with the law. H5 explores how cooperative
measures designed by the compliance officers influence attitudes towards nature.
The reformed Corporate Law on Environmental matters has enhanced transparency and
cooperation models with public authorities and regulatees [89–91].
The ethical approach nurtures these models and the civic values expressed in the Spanish
Criminal Code. The values are the basis to raise awareness of cooperation processes among regulatees,
to then fulfil the surveillance measures designed by the company. The aim is twofold: first, to follow the
requirements announced with regulatory compliance to protect nature; second, to avoid information
bias or any potential side effects of environmental policies.
H5 analyses how improved attitudes towards nature are related to the willingness to develop
a cooperative model and apply organizational standards as well as strengthen moral behavior
within the company. Companies must implement general cooperative guidelines based on moral
actions towards nature by gaining the ethical skills to carry out their duties responsibly [33,69].
Companies must rely on organizational values and principles to develop this behavior appropriately,
take the right decisions and allow internal or external agencies to monitor the environmental
company [92].
This recent perspective turns resistance to behavioral changes in managers into flexibility and
innovation in response to the challenges that the environment is currently facing [93,94].
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This innovative response comes when companies focus more on finding environmentally
ethical solutions [95] and discovering new opportunities to protect nature than in fulfilling rigid
regulations [42]. Compliance officers must, therefore, take ethical solutions from the Corporate
Compliance perspective. The Chief Ethics and Compliance Officers ensure that employers and
employees behave legally and ethically.
Hypotheses 4 (H4). Corporate Compliance in Environmental matters positively influences Cooperative
Environmental Protocols.
Hypotheses 5 (H5). Cooperative Environmental Protocols positively influence Better Attitude towards Nature).
3. Methodology
3.1. Measurement
After a thorough literature review on the impact of the new Corporate Governance Code on
environmental companies, the relationships, items and constructs presented in Figure 2 were proposed.
Figure 2. Conceptual scheme of the structural equation model utilized. Note: H1: Hypotheses 1;
H2: Hypotheses 2; H3: Hypotheses 3; H4: Hypothesis 4; H5: Hypothesis 5; BAN: Better
Attitudes towards Nature; CEE: Corporate Compliance in Environmental matters; COER: Coercive
Environmental Enforcement; COOP: Cooperative Environmental Protocols.
The items were designed considering the items of the questionnaire presented in Table 1 and were
grouped around the proposed constructs.
The questions of the survey were measured through the five-point Likert scale used to indicate
the degree of importance of the factors [96]. All factors or constructs were measured using a five-point
Likert scale ranging from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 5 (“strongly agree”). Sampling was applied to
the entire population. Of the 916 companies, 407, representing 45% of the total responses, responded
affirmatively to the survey. The survey was conducted over the phone, which entailed reading the
questions and transcribing the answers.
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Table 1. Latent variables and the elaborated questionnaire.
Latent Variables Questions
BAN:
Better Attitudes towards Nature
Is it important for your company to be aware of being a good
steward of natural resources (BAN1)?
Is it important for your company to be oriented towards not
polluting the environment when investing in resources (BAN2)?
Is it important for your company to have the attitude to respect
environment norms (BAN3)?
CCE:
Corporate Compliance in Environmental Issues
Is Corporate Compliance helping your company to respect
nature? (CCE1)
Is Corporate Compliance helping to prioritize Environmental
matters over economic ones? (CCE2)
Is Corporate Compliance helping you be more aware of possible
environmental damages (CCE3)?
Is it important for you to have a Compliance Officer in charge of
developing organizational measures? (CCE4)
COER:
Coercive Environmental Enforcement
Is it important for you to establish environmental control based
on organizational standards? (COER1)
Is it important for you to update the environmental control
standards in your company? (COER2)
Do you think that making the company responsible for
an environmental crime committed will contribute towards
respecting nature more efficiently? (COER3)
Is it important for you to avoid sanctions that may hinder the
reputation of the company? (COER4)
COOP:
Cooperative Environmental Enforcement
Is it important to have a mechanism based on cooperative norms
to avoid legal sanctions? (COOP1)
Is it important to implement organizational standards, especially
in departments at a higher risk of committing crimes? (COOP2)
Is it important for you to develop a cooperative model between
public authorities and employees to respect nature? (COOP3)
Is it important for you to have guidelines to strengthen moral
behavior? (COOP4)
Is it important for you to focus more on environmentally ethical
solutions and discover new opportunities to protect nature than
in the strict fulfilment of rigid regulations? (COOP5)
Is it important for you to set training protocols or procedures to
apply surveillance norms in your company? (COOP6)
Is it important for you to allocate financial resources to run the
corporate preventive model? (COOP7)
Is it important for you to include a disciplinary system to
prevent non-compliance through sanctions? (COOP8)
3.2. Questionnaire
An initial questionnaire was drafted based on the literature review. The questionnaire was
previously validated through four qualitative interviews conducted during two focus groups organized
in March 2018, involving important stakeholders belonging to both the private and public sectors.
The research team chose the waste management category among other options for two reasons:
first, residue and waste have become the main threats to the environment [97–105]; second, the waste
sector has more than 900 companies registered at the Ministry for Ecological Transition (Ministerio para
la Transición Ecológica). It is undoubtedly a significant sample within Spanish environmental companies.
A total of 407 environmental companies participated in the study. The research team telephoned
compliance officers and several heads of departments between January and March seeking responses
to the questionnaire (see questions in Table 1). This sampling period was selected because directors are
usually more willing to address research queries at the beginning of the year than any other time.
The questionnaire was validated through several procedures. The first was by conducting a pilot
survey with a limited number of companies. This verified that the choice of items and constructs of
the model were appropriate, and any that were ambiguous or could lead to errors were eliminated.
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As for the importance of these items, the reliability of the collected data was verified using
a statistical software tool (IBM SPSS 24, IBM Corporation, Armonk, NY, USA) [106]. The values
of the mean and the standard deviation were calculated accordingly. Subsequently, a t-test and
one-dimensional variance analysis were carried out to verify the consistency in the opinions of the
different groups of companies that participated in the survey. As a result of this process, items COOP7
and COER2 were eliminated from the original model, as can be seen in Figure 2. At the end of the
process, Harman’s single-factor test was used as a common method to measure publication bias [107].
The test did not detect any single factor that could explain most of the total variance, suggesting that
bias is very unlikely.
The data obtained through the questionnaires were analyzed using structural equation modelling
using variance (SEM). This statistical technique is applied when data are structured in a series
of interrelated dependency relations between the latent variables of the theory and the indicators.
They directly measure the observable variables [108]. The PLS technique (partial least squares) was
also applied, specifically recommended for compound models or constructs [108,109].
3.3. Dates and Sample
The structure and distribution of the population under study and in the sample is presented
in Table 2, which shows the different business epigraphs ordered by categories and subcategories.
Both are quantified by frequencies within the population and the sample.
Table 2. Waste management companies in Spain draw from the Ministry of the Ecological Transition.
Category Subcategory Population Sample
Encapsulation of toxic compounds with mining matrix 12 6
Management of empty containers 27 14
Management of graphic arts waste 20 10
Waste management
Management of pharmacy and hospital waste 19 10
Management of automotive workshops waste 20 10
Comprehensive management of industrial waste 23 12
Materials for waste incineration 11 6
Treatment of radioactive waste 15 8
Sludge and sludge treatments 11 6
Treatment and recycling of slurry 15 8
Treatment of paper recycling 18 9
Treatment of used oils and lubricants 14 7
Subtotal 205 103
Collection and
transport of waste
Collection of fluorescent lamps 11 4
Collection of used batteries 14 6
Collection of urban solid waste 21 8
Collection and transport of sludge 12 5
Collection and transport of special waste 13 5
Collection and transportation of hospital waste 12 5
Aerosol collection vehicles 15 6
Pneumatic trash transport 18 7
Emergency environmental service 14 6
Subtotal 130 52
Waste recovery
and recycling
Recovery of agricultural and livestock waste: composting 18 7
Appliance recovery 13 5
Recovery of toys and leisure equipment 19 8
Recovery and recycling of electronic waste 14 6
Recovery and recycling of wood 15 6
Recovery, treatment and recycling of the food sector 19 8
Recycling of materials 18 7
Recovery and recycling of packaging 19 8
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Table 2. Cont.
Category Subcategory Population Sample
Recovery and recycling of paper and cardboard 18 7
Recovery and recycling of plastics and rubber 19 8
Recovery and recycling of glass 17 7
Recycling of ferrous and non-ferrous metals 9 4
Recovery of hydrocarbons 12 5
Recovery and recycling of demolition waste 14 6
Recovery, recycling and textile valorisation 22 9
Subtotal 246 98
Total 916 407
3.4. Regulatory Compliance in Different Types of Spanish Environmental Companies
Table 3 shows that 77% of the companies are registered as “Limited liability” and 23% as
“Public limited liability”. The legal form is closely related to the size of the company in terms
of employees. The majority of environmental companies (79%) are “Micro” and “Small” companies,
whereas 13% are “Medium-sized” and 7% are “Large” enterprises.
Table 3. Type of companies.
Information N = 407 Percentage (%)
Legal forms
Limited liability company 315 77
Public limited liability company 92 23
Total 407 100
Size of the company
Microenterprises: less than 10 employees 175 43
Small enterprises: 10–49 employees 148 36
Medium-sized enterprises: 50–249 employees 54 13
Large enterprises: 250 or more employees. 30 7
Total 407 100
As Table 4 shows, data drawn from Spanish environmental companies reveal that 29% of the
Spanish environmental companies are aware of regulatory compliance, and only 5% have incorporated
an internal compliance officer’s activity, whereas 17% resort to external compliance officers.
This finding reveals another exciting breakthrough—namely, the 71 new compliance companies
that have recently emerged in Spain.
From these environmental companies, 11% have successfully developed and applied surveillance
norms in the company to avoid any potential unlawful acts committed by employees.
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Table 4. Regulatory compliance in Spanish environmental companies.
Information N = 407 Percentage (%)
Any knowledge about the recent Spanish Corporate Compliance
Yes 119 29
No 288 71
Total 407 100
Compliance officer
Internal compliance officer 21 5
External compliance officer 71 17
No 315 77
Total 407 100
Surveillance norms
Yes 43 11
No 364 89
Total 407 100
Disciplinary procedures
Yes 35 9
No 372 91
Total 407 100
4. Data Analysis
4.1. Analysis of the Measurement Model
The individual reliability of the load (λ) of each item was measured first. Typically, the minimum
level for acceptance is established as part of the construct, which is λ ≥ 0.707 [110].
Cronbach’s alpha and its composite reliability (CR) were used to test the consistency of the
constructs. This evaluation measures the consistency of a construct based on its indicators [111], that is,
the rigor with which these elements measure the same latent variable.
Cronbach’s alpha determines a consistency index for each construct and presents values between
0 and 1. The lower limit for the construct reliability of acceptance is generally established between 0.6
and 0.7 [112]. As can be seen in Table 5, the highest validity will be in values close to 1. All the variables
indicated minimum validity. The most common measure to assess convergent validity in PLS-SEM is
the average variance extracted (AVE). Using the same basis as that used with the individual indicators,
an AVE value of 50% or higher means that, on average, a construct accounts for more than half of
the variance of its own indicators [113,114]. Table 5 shows that all the constructs meet this criterion.
Besides, another indicator known as rho_A is verified [115], where all constructs exceed the value 0.7.
Table 5. Cronbach alpha, rho_A, composite reliability, and average variance extracted (AVE).
Cronbach’s Alpha rho_A Composite Reliability Average Variance Extracted (AVE)
BAN 0.831 0.835 0.898 0.747
CCE 0.890 0.896 0.924 0.754
COER 0.866 0.866 0.919 0.791
COOP 0.921 0.928 0.937 0.679
The left part of Table 6 shows the correlations between the constructs. The square roots of the AVE
are located on the diagonal of this table. A construct should share more variance with its measures
or indicators than with other constructs in a given model [116]. Thus, the square root of the AVE
(in bold) is greater than the correlation between that construct and the rest of the constructs in the
model. There are grounds to affirm that constructs share more variance with their indicators than
with other constructs of the model researched here [116] and have discriminant validity based on this
first analysis.
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However, Henseler, Ringle and Sarstedt [117] developed simulation studies to demonstrate that
a lack of discriminant validity is best detected by another technique: the heterotrait-monotrait (HTMT)
ratio, developed by them. The results obtained are listed on the right side of Table 6, which enables
verifying that all the HTMT ratios for each pair of factors are <0.90 [118].
Table 6. Measurement model: discriminant validity.
Fornell-Larcker Criterion Heterotrait-Monotrait Ratio (HTMT)
BAN CCE COER COOP BAN CCE COER COOP
BAN 0.864
CCE 0.640 0.868 0.735
COER 0.511 0.528 0.889 0.597 0.595
COOP 0.614 0.517 0.400 0.824 0.693 0.562 0.440
4.2. Structural Model Analyses
Table 7 shows the results related to contrasting the hypotheses formulated. These results show that
the measurement model is satisfactory. The structural model was tested, and the statistical significance
of the path coefficients were estimated based on a 5000-sample Bootstrapping test [119]. According to
Chin [120], the crucial criterion for evaluating the structural model is the coefficient of determination
(R2) of the endogenous latent variables. The R2 must be above 0.2 to be considered moderate.
Our endogenous constructs offer moderate values (R2 COER = 0.279, R2 COOP = 0.268). The main
endogenous construct yielded higher results (R2 BAN = 0.541). Therefore, the evidence shows that
this model is applicable in the context of Corporate Compliance and that it has a moderate to strong
explanatory capacity.
The results presented in Table 7 show that all relationships are supported. All relationships
are significant at 99.9% confidence levels, except for the relationship COER → BAN (β = 0.178,
p-value = 0.001) that is supported by a 99% confidence level. The relations with the greatest load are
two: CCE→ COER (β = 0.528, T-Statistic = 12.572) and CCE→ COOP (β = 0.517, T-Statistic= 11.072).
Regarding the measures of approximate adjustment of the model [121], the value is obtained from
the residual root mean square [122], known as the SRMR. This measures the difference between
the observed correlation matrix and the correlation matrix implied by the model. In our case,
SRMR = 0.07 is very close, but within the range, as it is said that a model has a goodness of fit
when SRMR < 0.08 [122].
The blindfolding procedure was used in respect to the predictive capacity of the model. To this
end, part of the data for a given construct was omitted during the estimation of parameters and then
what had been omitted was estimated using the estimation parameters [119]. The predictive relevance
of the model was studied through the Stone-Geisser test (Q2) [123,124], which revealed that the model
is predictive (Q2 = 0.377) since Q2 > 0.
Table 7. Comparison of hypotheses.
Hypotheses Effect Path Coefficient (β) T-Statistic (β/STDEV) p-Value Significant
H1 CCE→ BAN 0.362 8.910 0.000 Yes ***
H2 CCE→ COER 0.528 12.572 0.000 Yes ***
H3 COER→ BAN 0.178 3.396 0.001 Yes **
H4 CCE→ COOP 0.517 11.072 0.000 Yes ***
H5 COOP→ BAN 0.356 6.410 0.000 Yes ***
Notes: For N = 5000 subsamples, for T-distribution (499) Student’s in single queue: * p < 0.05 (T (0.05; 499) = 1.64791345);
** p < 0.01 (T (0.01; 499) = 2.333843952); *** p < 0.001 (T (0.001; 499) = 3.106644601).
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5. Discussion
5.1. Theoretical Implications
This research examined how Spanish environmental companies develop better attitudes towards
nature by following coercive or collaborative procedures. The results obtained have a significant
theoretical implication since they add new findings to the current literature on how to incorporate the
recent Spanish Corporate Governance Code into environmental decisions and improve compliance
with environmental legislation.
The findings of this research reveal that companies give special consideration to the new
Corporate Compliance. This importance is manifested in the fact that the relations with the
greatest statistical load are presented in H2 = CCE → COER (β = 0.528, T-Statistic= 12.572).
Therefore, at a theoretical level, this research shows that the implementation of Corporate Compliance
in Spain has an important effect as a coercive measure. How regulatory compliance influences coercive
norms in environmental companies is essential to understanding that compliance with the law is the
prior condition for designing coercive environmental enforcement in companies. It is important to
point out that whereas the formal structure of corporate legal liability gives companies an incentive to
reduce organizational misconduct [22], rules and regulations based on formal structures barely commit
them to a type or degree of compliance [23]. As H2 shows, environmental companies do not value
the number of external rules to be complied with, but pass the control over to the employees instead.
To increase the value of compliance, regulations must address key elements related to the benefits
of compliance for the company [47]; address regulatory compliance’s value [48]; and clarify the
convenience [50] and the social motivation of the rules [51].
Likewise, H4 = CCE → COOP (β = 0.517, T-Statistic= 11.072) is also highly significant.
Environmental companies are particularly interested in evading the sanctions by developing
surveillance measures to control the activities that may imply criminal behavior for companies.
Findings show how environmental companies are interested in developing surveillance norms to
protect nature through the regulatory compliance system. Similarly, cooperative Environmental
Protocols have played a relevant role in fostering environmental attitudes stressing how rules influence
employees’ attitudes and ethical behavior [25]. However, these results must be taken cautiously due to
the small number of companies aware of this regulation.
The same behavior occurs from the coercive point of view, and companies state that the new
code makes it essential to establish an environmental control based on the rules of the organization,
which update the control of environmental standards. Precisely, the responsibility of the company and
its managers for an environmental crime contributes towards respecting nature more efficiently and
prevents sanctions from damaging the reputation of the company.
The results, therefore, show that the new code fulfils its objective and that it not only increases
legal pressure on illegal environmental companies but also encourages the implementation of special
surveillance measures to address environmental crimes in companies. This fact leads us to agree with
other research [10] which pointed out that companies should implement effective monitoring and
organizational systems to avoid criminal sanctions and to better protect nature.
However, there is a relationship (H3) that has the least statistical significance in the model. It could,
therefore, be said that it is the relationship that is least present in the model. This relationship is between
COER → BAN (β = 0.178, p-value = 0.001), supported with a 99% confidence level. Even though
external environmental norms, such as governmental and legal norms, have provided a noticeable
improvement in human-living conditions and nature, they are not enough to enhance environmental
companies’ better attitudes towards nature. This means that the environmental and economic outcomes
have not been as effective as expected [55,56]. As a result, environmental companies have not been
able to build credibility appropriately in the eyes of stakeholders [56]. Then, the only legal attempts to
protect nature have not been consistent enough to address the environmental threat adequately [24].
H3 analyses how the new legal deterrence programme introduced by the recent Criminal Code
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contributes to improving companies’ attitude towards nature. Despite the adverse effects of the
deterrence policy, the Spanish Criminal Code promotes coercive measures by prosecuting unlawful
environmental companies, but it also allows companies to mitigate corporate sanctions, which exceed
the regulatory perspective [61].
The new regulatory compliance scenario has been understood as a step closer towards the
prosecution of companies. For the first time in history, companies can be taken to court when employees
commit unlawful actions. However, it is fair to say that the reformed law also allows companies to
mitigate corporate sanctions. From this perspective, is quite reasonable to understand that severe
punishment towards companies is not statistically significant.
5.2. Practical Implications
The findings obtained will have considerable implications for the Spanish and European
environmental authorities and will help to further dissuade companies from committing
environmental crimes.
From a practical point of view, the new code not only influences the improvement of
the environmental performance of companies through coercive and cooperative measures,
but it also has a direct effect. H1 shows this effect based on the findings of the relationship
between CCE→ BAN (β = 0.362, T-Statistic = 8.910, p-value = 0.000) with a high confidence
level (99.9%). This means that regulatory compliance positively influences the two key aspects of
environmental companies, the balance between economy and ecology in environmental companies
and the awareness of the potential damages to nature. Companies, therefore, understand that
corporate compliance contributes towards respecting nature, prioritizing environmental matters over
economic issues and being more aware of the potential environmental damage.
The fact that coercive measures have less influence than cooperative ones in companies’ attitudes
towards the environment has been predicted by some scholars [40,41]. This fact has both practical and
theoretical implications. The recently published code will help environmental companies collaborate
and become more aware to avoid sanctions that may adversely affect their reputations.
Another of the relations (H5) discussed was that established between COOP→ BAN. H5 analyses
how improved attitudes towards nature are related to the willingness to develop cooperative models
to implement organizational standards and strengthen the moral behavior within the company.
Then, findings show that compliance also has guided companies’ moral and civic duties [21].
Companies must implement general cooperative guidelines based on moral actions towards nature by
gaining the ethical skills to carry out their duties responsibly [33,69].
Companies have not only considered it important to have a mechanism based on cooperative
norms to avoid legal sanctions, but they also consider it a priority to develop a cooperative model
between public authorities and employees to respect nature. These transparency and cooperation
models have been widely introduced by the reformed corporate law [89–91].
The companies have considered that cooperative measures, such as implementing
an organizational standard, especially in departments with the highest risk of committing crimes,
are significantly influential (β = 0.356, p-value = 0.000) with a confidence level of 99.9%.
Finally, companies show a significant sensitivity towards the future of compliance with
the new code through the organizational standards developed by the Compliance Officer.
The companies surveyed considered it necessary to concentrate efforts on environmentally ethical and
managerial solutions. This can be done by discovering new opportunities to protect nature instead of
strictly complying with the regulations. This ethical relationship influences the future of the company
as confirmed by the predictive value of the model (Q2 = 0.377).
Therefore, the establishment of training protocols or procedures to apply surveillance standards
to employers and employees and allocate financial resources to execute the company’s preventive
model are vital to making the model more effective.
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Finally, the result obtained concerning the explanatory capacity of the model is moderately high
(R2 BAN = 0.541) and ensures that the new code will work as a disciplinary system to avoid sanctions.
6. Conclusions
This study had one primary aim: to study the effects of the publication of the new Code of
Environmental Conduct for companies in Spain. Its objectives were measured from three points
of view: the direct influence of the Spanish Criminal Code on improving environmental behavior
towards nature, the influence that coercive measures exert over environmental companies and, finally,
the cooperative standards within companies as surveillance measures to avoid sanctions.
The research concludes by stating that the three relationships have been tested and contrasted
by the model and that the new code will contribute towards improving the attitudes of companies in
the environmental sector. However, cooperative measures will have the most significant future and
influence—not only because of the planning component they entail, but because of the impact they
have on the results obtained.
Therefore, we recommend the authorities to relax the sanctioning capacity and promote
organizational and ethical measures, because they focus on favoring and rewarding companies that
establish protocols or training procedures to apply surveillance standards to employers and employees.
Moreover, it is essential to allocate financial resources to execute the company’s preventive model
for the model to be effective. In this sense, part of the sanctions could be reversed if environmental
training programmes are put into practice in these companies.
Another of the conclusions reached is the future importance of organizing a meeting and setting
up avenues for collaboration between companies and public authorities. Having a mechanism based on
cooperative rules to avoid legal sanctions could be a priority to improve the attitudes of companies in
respect of nature. In this sense, this research recommends the creation of meeting spaces; for example,
establishing public-private bodies, organizing conferences or meetings with companies or facilitating
advertising campaigns that encourage compliance with environmental regulations.
The type of companies is also a strong point of the research due to its great impact on
the environment. As you can see in Table 1, they are companies dedicated to the management,
transport and recycling of waste. These categories have a notable influence on the sensitivity towards
the environment since they are companies dedicated to improving the environment and reducing the
impact of industrial activities. That is another reason why the research has focused on this type of
environmental companies.
Concerning future research lines, the results should be compared with companies from other
categories of business activity, to see if the results agree and the model is applicable.
An obvious limitation must be expressed. The recent publication of the code has no impact
on this study. Temporary effects cannot be studied with a long temporal perspective, given its
recen publication. A longitudinal study, as the second line of research, may be conducted in a few
years’ time. This would allow a reflection on the effect of the Spanish Corporate Governance Code on
developing better attitudes towards nature with a broader perspective of environmental companies
over time.
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